Despite the fact that the new model of distributed photovoltaic development in the whole county has offered a fresh approach to solving the problems such as difficult absorption,serious abandonment of photovoltaic power and decentralized poverty alleviation efforts amid the commitment to"carbon peak and carbon neutrality",the problem of multi-subject decision-making among all stakeholders in photovoltaic poverty alleviation in the whole county market has become the top priority of the current poverty alleviation power station market operation.Based on the evolutionary game theory,a four-party evolutionary game model involving users,state-owned enterprises(including the State Grid),photovoltaic enterprises and the government is constructed,with the multi-subject decision-making evolution and parameter influence of photovoltaic poverty alleviation market in Gansu Province,Qinghai Province and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region studied.The results show that the equilibrium strategies of state-owned enterprises and photovoltaic enterprises are all positive,but the equilibrium results and time between users and the government are also different due to the differences in light resources,electricity prices and electricity consumption in various areas.The photovoltaic market in Gansu Province is balanced in the strategy set built by users without government subsidies.Areas with more abundant sunshine and significant government subsidies report considerable income from photovoltaic poverty alleviation,which means stronger users interest in investment and shorter time to achieve equilibrium;cost saving and rent reduction are effective measures to improve the equilibrium path in Northwest China.
关键词
光伏扶贫/整县模式/协同机制/四维演化博弈/路径
Key words
photovoltaic poverty alleviation/whole county model/synergy mechanism/four-dimensional evolutionary game/path
维普
万方数据