In order to effectively reduce the cost of power supply for users,the grid investment interface is required to extend to the user's red line.However,there is no uniform and reasonable standard on how to allocate the extension cost among the government,power grid enterprises and users.This paper firstly expounds the extension of the power grid investment interface and the interest demands of investment entities,and analyzes the investment cost of power access project.Secondly,aiming at maximizing the gap between the investment proportion of each entity and its least ideal proportion,the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining game model is constructed.The bargaining power is quantified through the initial investment proportion,risk sharing ratio and cooperation ability,so as to seek a fair and reasonable government-enterprise sharing strategy for power access costs.Finally,a study is conducted for a power access project in an economic development zone.The results show that the investment proportion among power grid enterprise,users,and government has been optimized from 0.65∶0.14∶0.21 to 0.61∶0.12∶0.27 0.27,and the satisfaction degree of all three entities has been improved.The satisfaction degree of power grid enterprise has been greatly improved due to its high bargaining power,which is helpful to promote the extension of the investment interface and further optimize the business environment.
关键词
电网接入工程/政企共担机制/投资策略优化/Nash-Harsanyi讨价还价/合作博弈
Key words
power access project/government-enterprise sharing mechanism/investment strategy optimization/Nash-Harsanyi bargaining/cooperative game
维普
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