首页|"党政同责"、官员流动与城市环境监管——来自变更与任期的多维证据

"党政同责"、官员流动与城市环境监管——来自变更与任期的多维证据

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中国地方官员的交流制度深刻影响主政行为。利用2011-2018年262个地级城市数据,区分市委书记、市长角色,通过变更、任期刻画流动,考虑多种交流形式和异质性策略,深度评估了官员流动的环境监管效应,为从政府行为视角理解官员流动的非预期影响提供了多维证据。研究发现,城市党政主要官员之一变更不利于环境监管水平的提升,党政主要官员同时变更或任期增加将提升环境监管力度;城市环境监管效应呈现市委书记为主导、市长协同的格局,2015年"党政同责"制度使该特征更加清晰,长任期情形下党政官员分工与互动能够促进经济环境协调发展。环境监管效应因交流形式、专业背景、是否升迁、有无环保部门任职经历而具有异质性。市委书记流动通过企业数量、产业结构、固定资产投资、外商投资等渠道影响城市环境监管力度。政策启示是应重视党政主要官员之一频繁流动对城市环境监管带来的非预期影响,强化党委对城市环境监管的引领,形成党政协同高效的绿色发展激励格局。
Co-responsibility of the Communist Party and Government,Official Mobility and Environment Governance
The exchange system of local government officials in China has a profound impact on governance behavior.Using a panel dataset of 262 cities from 2011 to 2018,this paper,distinguishing the the roles of city party secretary and mayor,describes official mobility with changes and tenure,provides an in-depth assessment of the environmental governance effects of official mobility by considering various exchange forms and heterogeneous strategies.The study finds that the change of officials has a negative impact on environ-mental governance,while the increase in tenure is conducive;the overall urban environmental governance is dominated by the city party secretary with the mayor being coordinated;the co-responsibility of the commu-nist party and government system made this feature prominent after 2015.It is clear that interaction between the two key officials will promote coordinated development of the economic environment in the case of a long tenure.The environmental governance effect of official mobility shows heterogeneity in dimensions such as different exchange forms,professional background,promotion and experience in environmental protection departments.The secretary mobility will affect the urban environmental governance through channels such as changing the number of enterprises,industrial structure,fixed asset investment,and foreign investment.The policy implications are that attention should be paid to the unintended impact of frequent official mobility on environmental governance,and leadership of the party committee officials in urban environmental gover-nance should be strengthened to form a green development incentive pattern with efficient coordination between the party and the government.

co-responsibility of the communist party and governmentofficial governanceofficial mobilitycity environmental governanceunintended consequence

马本、张晨涛

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中国人民大学环境学院(北京 100872)

党政同责 官员治理 官员流动 城市环境监管 非预期影响

国家自然科学基金青年基金

72103194

2024

中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)
中国地质大学

中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.69
ISSN:1671-0169
年,卷(期):2024.24(2)
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