Carbon Data Quality Compliance and Corporate Rent-seeking Regulation—A Study on the Improvement of the Third Party Verification Regulatory Sys-tem from an Evolutionary Game Perspective
Ensuring carbon data quality compliance is a prerequisite for the binary function of carbon data.However,the current third-party verification regulatory system for carbon data quality compliance(hereinaf-ter referred to as the regulatory system)is weak in regulating the rent-seeking behaviours of carbon data falsi-fication by enterprises.By constructing an evolutionary game system involving regulators,enterprises and verification agencies,and using mathematical economic analysis methods for model derivation and numerical simulation to explore the impacts and implications of changes in key factors on the evolutionary stable state of the game system,we can clarify the behavioural logics of the game players and explore solutions to compen-sate for the deficiencies of the current regulatory system.It is found that:(1)the behavioural choices of the regulator are affected by complex factors,and the improvement of the objective regulatory capacity of the regulator needs to be synergistic with other key parameters in order to significantly increase the evolutionary speed;(2)the behavioural choices of the members of the rent-seeking coalition interact with each other with consistency;(3)the use of the law can compensate for the fact that"data altruism"cannot boost the willing-ness of enterprises to report compliant carbon data,but certain quantitative constraints need to be met in order to ensure the stability of the gaming system;(4)the behavioural choices of enterprises and verification agen-cies have obvious cost-following characteristics,and the costs of rent-seeking,carbon data cost,and non-compliance verification cost are the key factors influencing the evolution of the gaming system and the leap to a stable state.Aiming at the goal of carbon data quality compliance,the current regulatory system can be improved in three aspects:enhancing the motivation of compliance,improving the regulatory capacity and increasing the pressure of counterfeiting.
carbon datathird-party verification agencyrent-seekingevolutionary gamegame analysis of law