全民所有自然资源资产所有权委托代理监管机制研究
Research on Principal-agent Supervision Mechanism for the Ownership of Natural Resource Assets Owned by the Whole People
马羽男 1杨国强 1赵学刚2
作者信息
- 1. 西南政法大学经济法学院,重庆 401120
- 2. 西南大学法学院,重庆 400700
- 折叠
摘要
文章归纳了行政委托代理理论在中国的发展历程,分析了全民所有自然资源资产所有权委托代理机制的形成背景、运行机制及其双重属性,同时研究剖析自然资源资产委托代理机制实践,指出当前监管机制的不足之处.研究显示:监管机制中存在"监管轻视""违规再委托""权利残缺"等问题,其原因在于监管角色不明确和监管模式缺陷.基于此,提出通过探索厘清监管角色、改善监管模式等方式,完善全民所有自然资源资产所有权委托代理监管机制的建议.
Abstract
The paper summarizes the development process of the administrative principal-agent theory in China,analyzes the formation background,operation mechanism,and dual attributes of the principal-agent mechanism for the ownership of natural resource assets owned by the whole people,and studies and analyzes the practice of the principal-agent mechanism for natural resource assets,and highlights the shortcomings of the current supervision mechanism.The research shows that there are problems in the regulatory mechanism,such as making light of regulatory,illegal redelegation,and disability of rights,which are caused by the unclear role of supervision and the defects of supervision mode.Based on this,the paper suggests improving the principal-agent supervision mechanism for the ownership of natural resource assets owned by the whole people by exploring and clarifying the role of supervision and improving the supervision mode.
关键词
自然资源资产/所有权/委托代理/监管机制Key words
natural resource assets/ownership/principal-agent/supervision mechanism引用本文复制引用
基金项目
重庆市社会科学规划重大课题(2023NDZD04)
出版年
2024
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据