The Channel Game between the Hotel Direct Official Website and the Online Travel Agent
The hotel's discourse right to the online travel agent(referred to as OTA)is mainly manifested in commission bargaining power and room pricing power.In recent has years,the hotel has focused on operating the official website to regain the discourse right to the OTA,Taking this the background it targets to tackle the channel game issues between the hotel online direct channel and the OTA.The neglected cost is taken as the decision variables to construct a one-to-one game model and the realization conditions of the optimal returns are discussed under three models:the"single-channel official website model,"the"dual-channel merchant model,"and the"dual-channel agent model."It is found that:Firstly,the hotel does not necessarily need to cooperate with OTA to achieve the best revenue.Under certain conditions,the hotel can achieve the best profit by adopt-ing the single-channel official website model.Secondly,when a hotel decides to cooperate with an OTA,the dual-channel merchant model can be used to maximize profits,and there are two conditions for its realization.Finally,when the hotel achieves the best revenue under the dual-channel merchant model,the hotel and the OTA can only meet the participation constraint and cannot achieve incentive compatibility.
万方数据
维普
