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自营或联营?创新投资影响下强势零售商延保服务模式选择

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本文研究了创新投资对强势零售商延保服务模式的影响.研究发现:不论制造商是否进行创新投资,零售商都仅在原厂延保成本优势大于50%时表现出合作倾向.但创新投资放宽了零售商和制造商达成联营的市场规模以及费用阈值等条件,促进了双方的联营意愿.原厂延保成本优势越大,越容易达成联营,且联营实现了双方的帕累托改进.随着消费者延保价格敏感性和延保成本差异变化,制造商呈现不同的合作态度,但联营动机始终比零售商强烈.子博弈精炼纳什均衡显示,创新投资是制造商的支配性策略,零售商也从创新投资中"搭便车"获利.零售商适当放宽联营条件有益于消费者剩余和社会福利的提升.
Retailer's Optimal Extended Warranty Strategy?Collaboration with Manufacturer or Not
The impact of manufacturers'innovation investment on the extended warranty service model of powerful retailer is studied.The research shows that no matter whether the manufacturer invests in innovation or not,retailer shows cooperation tendency only when the cost advantage of OEM is more than 50%.However,innovation investment relaxes the market scale and fixed cost threshold of joint venture between retailers and manufacturers,and promotes the joint venture willingness of both sides.The greater the cost advantage of OEM,the easier it is to reach cooperation,and the cooperation realizes Pareto improvement of both sides.With the change of price sensitivity and cost difference,manufacturer show different cooperative attitudes,but the cooperation motivation is always stronger than retailer.The sub game perfect Nash equilibrium shows that innovation investment is the dominant strategy of manufacturers,and retailers also"free ride"from innovation investment.Finally,through numerical analysis,it is found that the appropriate relaxation of cooperation conditions by retailer is beneficial to the improvement of consumer surplus and social welfare.The research results can provide theoretical and practical enlightenment for the extended warranty service cooperation between manufacturer and retailer.

self-operationjoint operationinnovation investmentextended warranty service

刘震、郭强、聂佳佳

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西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川 成都 610031

自营 联营 创新投资 延保服务

国家自然科学基金项目"服务科学与创新"四川省重点实验室开放课题"服务科学与创新"四川省重点实验室开放课题

72071165KL2313KL2107

2024

中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.938
ISSN:1003-207X
年,卷(期):2024.32(1)
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