首页|滋养你的竞争对手?——考虑电商平台自有品牌的平台需求信息共享策略

滋养你的竞争对手?——考虑电商平台自有品牌的平台需求信息共享策略

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针对一个供应商和一个电商平台组成的在线销售系统,在电商平台自有品牌引入决策内生的条件下,研究了平台需求信息共享策略.研究表明:引入自有品牌时,分享需求信息在分销模式下会产生双重边际效应和品牌竞争效应,代销模式下则为收益增加效应和品牌竞争效应.不同销售模式下的需求信息共享策略具有显著差异,当自有品牌引入固定成本过高或者过低时,分销模式下电商平台偏好保留需求信息,代销模式下偏向共享需求信息;当自有品牌引入固定成本中等且产品替代率较大时,电商平台可以通过需求信息共享偏好反转来推动自有品牌的引入.
Nourish Your Competitor?——Demand Information Sharing of E-commerce Platform in the Presence of Store Brand Encroachment
With the great success and huge data of e-commerce platforms,e-commerce platform giants such as Amazon,Kogan,JD,and T-mall aggressively expand their store brand(SB)business.The SB encroachment changes the interaction between the national brand(NB)suppliers and e-commerce platforms.The NB manufacturers not only sell NBs products on the platform but also compete with the platform.In other words,the SB encroachment transforms the relationship between the platform and manufacturer into a co-opetition relationship.The e-commerce platform faces a dilemma when deciding information sharing strategy.Hence,the issue of the market conditions under which the platform has an incentive to share information becomes more perplexing when considering the SB encroachment option.A game-theoretic model is developed to examine the interaction between demand information sharing and SB encroachment in a supply chain consisting of one sup-plier and one e-commerce platform.The equilibrium results are solved by backward induction.Depending on whether the e-commerce platform shares information in stage 1,and whether the platform introduces an SB in stage 2,there are 4 subgames consisting of stage 3.These 4 subgames are analyzed,respectively,and then the equilibrium demand information sharing and SB introduction strategies are drived by comparing the e-commerce platform's profits in these 4 subgames.The results show that demand information sharing has a double marginalization effect and brand competition effect under reselling mode,while revenue increasing effect and brand competition effect will be generated under agency selling mode.Demand information sharing strategies differ significantly under different sales modes.When the entry cost is very low or sufficiently high,the e-commerce platform prefers information sharing under agency selling mode,whereas the platform keeps demand information private under reselling mode.When the entry cost is intermediate and the product substitution coef-ficient is high,the e-commerce platform can promote store brand encroachment through a demand information sharing strategy.

e-commerce platformstore branddemand information sharingreselling modeagency selling mode

喻冬冬、罗春林、万谧宇、王彪

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江西财经大学信息管理学院,江西 南昌 330013

南阳理工学院范蠡商学院,河南 南阳 473000

华东交通大学交通运输工程学院,江西 南昌 330013

电商平台 自有品牌 需求信息共享 分销模式 代销模式

国家自然科学基金项目国家自然科学基金项目国家自然科学基金项目国家自然科学基金项目江西省自然科学基金项目河南省高校人文社会科学研究项目河南省科技厅软科学项目

7227206971862014721610157236201520202BABL2010122023-ZZJH-035232400411065

2024

10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2446

中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子：1.938
ISSN：1003-207X
年,卷(期)：2024.32(1)
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