Green Technology Selection and Product Pricing Research under C & T and Government Subsidies
In this paper,under the background of carbon emission cap and trade(C & T)policy,the Stackelberg game model of maximizing government welfare and controlling and emission enterprise's profit is constructed to explore the choice of green technology and product pricing decisions of controlling and emission enterprises under different government subsidies(unit product subsidy and green technology cost subsidy).Furthermore,the influence of different government subsidies on carbon emission control enterprises and social welfare is further analyzed.The results show that compared with the cost subsidy of green technology,the optimal price of unit product subsidy is higher,and will lead to more green production and consumption.The cost subsidy of green technology has lower carbon emissions and higher corporate profits.When the total budget of government subsidy is the same,the cost subsidy of green technology is more likely to encourage enterprises to invest in green technology.It is shown that government subsidies cannot guarantee the investment in green technologies and the reduction of total carbon emissions of enterprises,but depend on the range of green technol-ogy cost,carbon emission reduction rate and carbon emission intensity of enterprises.In addition,the social welfare under unit product subsidy is better than the social welfare under green technology cost subsidy.Numeri-cal experiments verify the results of this paper.Finally,some suggestions on government subsidy policy are given.
万方数据
维普
