首页|政府干预下装配式建筑产业链核心企业协作策略研究

政府干预下装配式建筑产业链核心企业协作策略研究

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装配式建筑产业链核心企业的协作水平影响产业链的整体性和生产绩效的提高，政府通常采用财政补贴、用地支持等行政干预手段促进产业链整合和发展。本文构建了政府干预下装配式建筑核心企业(设计单位、构件生产商和施工企业)三种群之间的协作行为演化博弈模型，并采用系统动力学方法分析初始策略及关键参数对三方策略演化路径的影响。研究结果表明:在政府正向干预下，设计单位、构件生产商和施工企业三方策略间相互影响，当双方选择合作策略的初始概率较高时，系统更易达到三方合作的稳定状态;三方的原始交易成本及其降低系数、合作所得政府补贴及合作效益等因素对系统趋于协作方向演化具有正向作用，设置合理的合作效益分配系数能够有效驱动三方合作;三方的合作成本对系统趋于协作方向演化具有负向作用，各主体选择合作付出的成本越低，系统收敛于合作稳定状态的速度越快。研究结果对优化装配式建筑产业链主体的协作机制、引导产业链核心企业的协同发展具有一定的参考意义。
Research on Cooperation Strategy of Core Enterprises in Prefabricated Construction Industry Chain under Government Intervention
The cooperation level of the core enterprises of the prefabricated construction industry chain affects the integrity of the industry chain and the improvement of production performance.The government usually adopts administrative intervention means such as financial subsidies and land support to promote the integration and development of the industry chain.An evolutionary game model of cooperative behavior among three groups of prefabricated construction core enterprises(design units,component manufacturers and construction companies)is constructed under government intervention,and the influence of initial strategy and key parameters on the evolution path of tripartite strategies is analyzed by using the system dynamics method.The research results show that under the positive government intervention,the design unit,the tripartite strategies of the design unit,component manufacturer and construction company influence each other.When the initial probability of the two parties choosing cooperation strategy is higher,the system is more likely to reach the stable state of tripartite cooperation.The factors such as original transaction cost and its reduction coefficient,government subsidies and cooperation benefits of the three parties have a positive effect on the evolution of the system towards cooperation.Setting a reasonable distribution coefficient of cooperation benefits can effectively drive tripartite cooperation.The cooperation cost of the three parties has a negative effect on the evolution of the system towards cooperation,and the lower the cost of each entity choosing to cooperate,the faster the system converges to the stable state of cooperation.The research results have a certain reference significance for optimizing the cooperation mechanism of the main body of the assembly building industry chain and guiding the cooperative development of the core enterprises in the industry chain.

construction industry chaingovernment interventioncooperation strategyevolutionary gamesystem dynamics

杨增科、樊瑞果、黄炜、石世英

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河南理工大学土木工程学院,河南 焦作 454000

西安建筑科技大学土木工程学院,陕西 西安 710055

建筑产业链 政府干预 协作策略 演化博弈 系统动力学

国家自然科学基金面上项目国家自然科学基金面上项目河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目河南省重点研发与推广专项(软科学研究)项目陕西省杰出青年科学基金

51978566523781932021-ZZJH-1332324004101512018JC-025

2024

10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1156

中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子：1.938
ISSN：1003-207X
年,卷(期)：2024.32(3)
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