Stochastic Evolutionary Decision Analysis of Collaborative Prevention and Control Strategies for Public Health Emergencies
Frequent public health emergencies have brought severe challenges to the life and property of the country and the people,and strengthening the collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies has become an important issue in social governance.Aiming at the high uncertainty in the process of strategy interaction and behavior evolution between local governments and the public in public health emergencies,a stochastic evolutionary game model for collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies is constructed to analyze the evolutionary stability strategy and evolution process of local governments and the public.It is found that the local government evolves to the stable strategy faster than the public;The stochastic interference factors will slow down the speed at which local governments and thepublic evolve into stable strate-gies;When the probability of epidemic spreading gradually increases,the impact on the change of local govern-ment strategy is greater,followed by the public.With the increasing of punishment coefficient to local govern-ment and the public,local government and the public are more inclined to choose(active prevention and control,voluntary isolation)strategy,and the local government has a stronger response to punishment.The stochastic evolution decision-making model for collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies constructed in the article provides theoretical reference and practical basis for scientific prevention of public health emergencies.
public health emergenciescollaborative prevention and controlstochastic disturbancestochastic evolutionary game
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