中国管理科学2024,Vol.32Issue(3) :237-247.DOI:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2078

突发公共卫生事件协同防控策略的随机演化决策分析

Stochastic Evolutionary Decision Analysis of Collaborative Prevention and Control Strategies for Public Health Emergencies

贾芳菊 周坤 李廉水
中国管理科学2024,Vol.32Issue(3) :237-247.DOI:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2078

突发公共卫生事件协同防控策略的随机演化决策分析

Stochastic Evolutionary Decision Analysis of Collaborative Prevention and Control Strategies for Public Health Emergencies

贾芳菊 1周坤 2李廉水3
扫码查看

作者信息

  • 1. 无锡学院数字经济与管理学院,江苏 无锡 214105;南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,江苏 南京 210044
  • 2. 盐城师范学院商学院,江苏 盐城 224002;南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,江苏 南京 210044
  • 3. 南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,江苏 南京 210044
  • 折叠

摘要

频繁发生的突发公共卫生事件给国家和人民的生命财产带来了严峻挑战,加强对突发公共卫生事件的协同防控成为社会治理中的重要议题.针对突发公共卫生事件中地方政府和社会公众策略互动与行为演化过程中的高度不确定性问题,构建突发公共卫生事件协同防控随机演化博弈模型,分析地方政府和社会公众的演化稳定策略和演化过程.研究发现,地方政府比社会公众演化至稳定策略的速度更快;随机干扰因素会减缓地方政府和社会公众演化至稳定策略的速度;当疫情扩散概率逐渐升高时,对地方政府策略改变的影响较大,其次为社会公众;随着对地方政府和社会公众惩罚系数逐渐加大,地方政府和社会公众更倾向于选择(积极防控,自愿隔离)策略,并且地方政府对惩罚的反应更为强烈.文章所构建的突发公共卫生事件协同防控随机演化决策模型为突发公共卫生事件的科学预防提供理论参考和现实依据.

Abstract

Frequent public health emergencies have brought severe challenges to the life and property of the country and the people,and strengthening the collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies has become an important issue in social governance.Aiming at the high uncertainty in the process of strategy interaction and behavior evolution between local governments and the public in public health emergencies,a stochastic evolutionary game model for collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies is constructed to analyze the evolutionary stability strategy and evolution process of local governments and the public.It is found that the local government evolves to the stable strategy faster than the public;The stochastic interference factors will slow down the speed at which local governments and thepublic evolve into stable strate-gies;When the probability of epidemic spreading gradually increases,the impact on the change of local govern-ment strategy is greater,followed by the public.With the increasing of punishment coefficient to local govern-ment and the public,local government and the public are more inclined to choose(active prevention and control,voluntary isolation)strategy,and the local government has a stronger response to punishment.The stochastic evolution decision-making model for collaborative prevention and control of public health emergencies constructed in the article provides theoretical reference and practical basis for scientific prevention of public health emergencies.

关键词

突发公共卫生事件/协同防控/随机干扰/随机演化博弈

Key words

public health emergencies/collaborative prevention and control/stochastic disturbance/stochastic evolutionary game

引用本文复制引用

基金项目

国家社会科学基金(16ZDA047)

国家自然科学基金(71673145)

无锡学院引进人才科研启动专项(2023r052)

出版年

2024
中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.938
ISSN:1003-207X
参考文献量30
段落导航相关论文