Ultimate Ownership Structure and Entrusted Loan Behavior of Enterprises
As China's economy steps into the"new normal",structural problems caused by economic growth have become prominent one of the important problems,"Moving from real to virtual"attracting extensive atten-tion from the business and academic.In particular,entrusted loan transaction develops rapidly and has become an important part of the social financing system.A large number of entity enterprises engage in financial activi-ties and allocate their own funds to entrusted loan transaction,which has gradually become an important feature of capital allocation behavior of entity enterprises in China.In this context,it is very important to clarify the influencing factors of entrusted loans for the normative development of corporate governance.Using manually collected dataset of entrusted loans of A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2016 in China,the effect of ultimate ownership structure on entrusted loan behavior of enterprises is examined.Our results show that differ-ent structures of ultimate shareholder ownership have different effects on enterprises engaged in entrusted loans.Cash flow right significantly decreases the behavior of entrusted loans with the tunneling motivation.The divergence between control right and cash flow right significantly increases the behavior of entrusted loans with tunneling motivation.Furthermore,the different effects of cash flow right and control-ownership wedge are significantly reflected in affiliated entrusted loans.State-owned property of enterprises weakens the significant effect of cash flow right and control-ownership wedge on entrusted loan behavior.New evidence is provided for a comprehensive understanding of the economic consequences of ownership structure,and enlightenment is also provided for understanding the influencing factors of enterprise entrusted loan behavior in this paper.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
