Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Innovation of Automakers under Dual-credit Policy
In order to adapt to the development of the automobile industry under the conversion of new and old kinetic energy in China,the five ministries have implemented dual-credit policy.However,a single market mechanism has not met what government expects.Therefore,a dynamic evolutionary game model of coopera-tive innovation of blade electric vehicle companies and oil-fueled automotive companies is constructed under or without government supervision.The impacts of factors such as NEV credit ratio,standard vehicle calculation method,and reward and punishment mechanism on the evolution of cooperative innovation are analyzed.The research shows that under the dual-credit policy,appropriately raising the requirement of NEV credit ratio helps blade electric vehicle companies quickly respond to market cooperation needs,which avoids the loss of market share caused by slow response.Besides,the correlation among various factors should be fully considered.Enhancing multiplicative coefficient contributes to innovative subjects evolving in the direction of active coopera-tion,which promotes the market diffusion of blade electric vehicles.Under the combined guidance of govern-ment supervision and dual-credit policy,moderately enhancing degree of awards and punishments can effectively encourage innovative subjects to evolve in the direction of active cooperation.Also,promoting func-tion of punishment mechanism is more powerful.
blade electric vehicledual-credit policyevolutionary gamecooperative innovation
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
