首页|非对称信息下考虑绿色偏好差异化与碳约束的减排定价策略优化

非对称信息下考虑绿色偏好差异化与碳约束的减排定价策略优化

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气候恶化促使政府倡导低碳发展,企业既要遵从碳约束又要满足消费者需求才能实现可持续发展。文章考虑消费者绿色偏好差异化和非对称信息的影响,构建策略型消费者、减排企业与政府组成的带约束的两阶段博弈决策模型。首先通过逆向选择机制优化企业减排定价策略,然后设计能兼顾经济与环境效益的碳政策,最后针对不同市场结构进行仿真模拟,发现:(1)当市场中绿色消费者较多时,碳交易价格随绿色偏好强度而递增;当普通消费者更多时,碳价随偏好强度而递减。(2)减排技术进步和信息壁垒加剧会使企业加大减排投入,当减排难度较大时,政府可提高碳配额、降低碳价或加强碳标签政策。(3)针对高排放企业的碳政策:当政府为了促进减排、缩小产品差异时,应实施紧缩的碳配额政策;为了提高社会福利时,应放宽碳约束并提高碳价。(4)政府在低或中等偏好市场中提高碳价、均匀市场中降低碳价,能促进社会减排。
Optimization of Emission Reducing and Pricing Decisions Based on Differentiated Green Preference and Carbon Constraints under Information Asymmetry
The rapid development of human society brings about the continuous deterioration of the environ-ment,leading many countries put the green development on the agenda.Enterprises should concurrently satisfy the carbon policy constraints and consumer behavior in order to achieve sustained development.Therefore,it is important to optimize the pricing and emission reduction strategy for firms and the carbon policy decision-making for government under various market structures.Based on consumer preference differentiation and information asymmetry,a two-stage game theory model consists of strategic consumers,emission-constraint enterprise and government is built:Firstly,the enterprise's decisions on emission reducing and pricing is optimized by adverse selection method;Then the carbon policies are designed which can improve both economic and environmental benefits for government;Ultimately,the results are simulated under three market structures.(1)When there are more green consumers in the market,the carbon trading price increases with the growth of green preference,while when less green consumers,the trading price decreases;(2)The carbon reduction degree will be raised with the improvement of reduction technology and the aggravation of information barrier.When marginal reduc-tion cost is high,the government should increase carbon quota,reduce carbon price or implement stricter label-ing policy.(3)When the government implements carbon policies for high-pollution enterprise,the carbon quota should be reduced with the aim of higher reduction degree and less product differentiation.Otherwise,the carbon constraint should be relaxed and trading price should be increased with the goal of higher social welfare.(4)In order to stimulate emission reduction,the government should raise the carbon trading price in a low-preference and normal-preference market,and reduce the price in a similar-preference market.On the other hand,in order to optimize the enterprise's profit,the government should control the trading price higher or lower than a certain value in a low-preference market,increase the carbon price in a similar-preference market and decrease the price in a normal-preference market.

carbon emission reductioncarbon policiesdifferentiated green demandinformation asymmetry

李璟、谢家平、古丽扎尔·艾赛提

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上海政法学院经济管理学院,上海 201701

上海财经大学商学院,上海 200433

新疆财经大学工商管理学院,新疆 乌鲁木齐 830012

碳减排 碳政策组合 差异化绿色需求 非对称信息

国家社会科学基金重大项目国家社会科学基金重点项目国家社会科学基金青年项目

20&ZD06020AJY00822CGL020

2024

中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.938
ISSN:1003-207X
年,卷(期):2024.32(4)
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