Four-dimensional Evolutionary Games Analysis for Local Governments Atmospheric Governance Considering Multiple Behavioral Strategies
Atmospheric pollution governance has experienced three stages including negative governance,local governance and collaborative governance.The systematic air protection policy was not formulated and the attitude of air pollution control was negative in early days due to the lack of awareness of air protection.With the promulgation of"Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law"in 1987,the territorial governance model was formed.The governance idea of regional air pollution joint prevention and control was formally proposed in 2010 to solve the regional and compound air pollution which territorial governance is unable to deal with and the related work has also been continuously promoted in recent years.Local governments are regarded as the main force of air pollution control because of their authority and regionality.The effectiveness of atmospheric governance is directly affected by their behavioral choices.By constructing a binary group to improve the classi-cal evolutionary game method,local governments'multiple behavioral strategies including negative governance,territorial governance and collaborative governance are depicted.Taking local government 1 as an example,the binary group is denoted as(w,x),where w represents the probability of local government 1 actively controlling air pollution,x represents the probability of it participating in coordination between govern-ments,0＜w＜1,0＜x＜1.Accordingly,the probability of local government 1 choosing collaborative governance is wx,the probability of choosing territorial governance is w(1-x)and the probability of choosing passive governance is 1-w.The binary group(1,1)corresponds to collaborative governance,(1,0)cor-responds to territorial governance,and(0,x)corresponds to passive governance.On this basis,a four-dimensional evolutionary game model of local governments in regional air pollution control is established,the system stability state and evolutionary trajectory are analyzed and the impacts of different factors on the col-laborative governance relationship are mainly discussed in this paper.The results show both direct governance cost and collaborative incremental cost have a negative impact on collaborative governance relationship,and the negative impact of collaborative governance cost is greater than that of direct governance cost.Both direct governance benefit and collaborative addition benefit have a positive impact on collaborative governance relation-ship,and the positive impact of direct governance benefit is linearly stable,while that of collaborative addition benefit will decrease marginally.Ecological compensation between local governments is not necessarily conducive to collaborative governance relationship.Only by enhancing supervision and improving the prob-ability of random inspection can ecological compensation really play a promoting role.
multiple behavioral strategieslocal governmentsregional air pollutionevolutionary game
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
