Stability of Food Safety Social Co-governance Evolutionary Game with Multi-agent Participation
Food safety is related to people's health and life safety,and the 20th report of the Communist Party of China proposes to strengthen food and drug safety supervision.On the one hand,information asymmetry leads to market failure,on the other hand,China's food enterprises are generally characterized by small scale,a large number,and low concentration,which also leads to government supervision failure.Therefore,in the case of market failure and government failure,third-party supervision is needed.Food safety involves multiple stakeholders,each of which has its interest demands,and there are often contradictions and conflicts among dif-ferent stakeholders.So,how do different stakeholders choose strategies in food safety governance?Can they achieve the desired stable equilibrium?How do different game players dynamically adjust their equilibrium strategies?A game model composed of local government,food enterprises,and the public is built.Secondly,the equilibrium point and evolutionary stability strategy of the system under different situations are analyzed by using the replicative dynamic equation.Then,numerical simulation is used to verify the stability strategies in the three situations,the influence of different initial states on the system evolution results is analyzed,and the influence of the change of main parameter values on the evolution path of each participant is also analyzed.The results show that there are three stable equilibrium strategies in the social co-governance game system of food safety,and the system evolution equilibrium evolves to different stable equilibrium strategies with the change of illegal profits of food enterprises,government punishment intensity,and government reward to the public.The intensity of government punishment,the cost of government supervision,and the illegal profits of food enterprises are the main factors that affect the evolution path of participants'behavior.The three stable equilibrium strategies correspond to different stages of the evolution of China's food safety governance system.In order to alleviate the risk of food safety governance,the government should increase the punishment,reduce the cost of supervision,strengthen the self-discipline of enterprises,guide the public to participate in governance,and construct the social co-governance pattern of multi-subject mutual coordination.
NETL
NSTL
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