Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Enterprises Carbon-reduction under the Driven of Carbon Trading
Carbon trading,as one of the most efficient market means in emission reduction policy,has a profound impact on enterprise carbon-reduction.Based on system dynamic theory,within the constraints of public willingness,an evolutionary game model of government and enterprise carbon-reduction is constructed under the driven of carbon trading.Taking Hubei Province as an example,through the visual analysis of govern-ment and enterprise behavior,possible game situations between government and enterprises in the development of carbon trading are discussed,and the corresponding strategies are given.The results show that there are several different game results in the development of carbon market.For the game equilibrium of(action,carbon-reduction),it is necessary to encourage enterprises to take emission reduction measures and prolong the"window period"of carbon reduction.Adopting the strategies of dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy can eliminate the periodic behavior pattern in the game between government and enterprises.By reducing carbon emission and regulating carbon price,the strategy combination can be changed from(inaction,no reduction)to(action,carbon-reduction).The proportion of the latter combination should be increased.The initial willing-ness is very important in the game between government and enterprises.The higher initial willingness is more conducive to achieve(action,carbon-reduction)strategy combination.The conclusions have strong implica-tions for enterprise carbon reduction strategies and government action in the process of carbon trading,and provide a reference for the development of carbon market.
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