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直播带货的合作模式与决策优化

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本文研究了主播和商家在直播带货中的合作模式及其决策优化问题。建立了佣金率由直播市场决定情形下和佣金率由双方Nash讨价还价下的三种序贯博弈模型,引入直播人气值、商品折扣率和直播转化率设计了新的直播带货需求函数,分析了不同合作模式下双方的最优运营决策、消费者福利、竞争均势及其合作稳定性。研究结果表明:(1)佣金率由直播市场决定时,双方在6种合作模式下均无法达成合作均衡,且难以通过利润共享或成本分担契约实现长期协作;而引入佣金率协商机制后,可在一定程度上改善直播带货效益。(2)当前商家决定商品折扣率,主播负责直播转化率的合作模式,实际上是一种直播销售效率最低的"囚徒困境"式合作模式;当市场佣金率较高时,由强势"头部"主播来主导直播带货反而是最佳的一种合作模式。(3)直播坑位费并未对双方合作策略的选取产生实质性影响,而主播和商家通过虚标商品市场价并制定高折扣率来获利始终存在较强的"合谋"动机。本文研究可为当前直播市场治理和运营优化提供一定的支持。
Cooperation Modes and Decision Optimization in Live Streaming Commerce
In recent years,as a distinctive emerging business form in the field of China's digital economy,the live streaming commerce has developed vigorously.Especially in the post-epidemic era,it will play an important role in solving a large number of social flexible employment and even reshaping e-commerce consump-tion behavior in China.Many well-known companies such as Gree Electric Appliances and Unilever have entered the live streaming market through self-operated live streaming or cooperative live streaming.However,with the diversification of participants in the live streaming,chaos emerges endlessly.Merchants,anchors,and live streaming platforms have suffered a lot of disputes and even resorted to law around price discounts,commis-sion rates,pit fees,platform commissions,marketing and promotion expenses,etc.These phenomena essentially belong to the cooperation or contract governance issues of live streaming commerce.The motivation of this study is(1)What are the main cooperation modes or contract paradigms between merchants and anchors in live streaming?(2)How do they choose an efficient cooperation mode based on actual business scenarios?Are these cooperation modes short-term or long-term stable?(3)In their cooperation,how to determine important decision-making variables such as price discount rate,commission rate,and promotional expenses?How will these variables affect the sales and benefits of live streaming?(4)Can consumers really benefit from these cooperation?Thus,the cooperation modes and decision optimization of anchors and merchants are investigated in live streaming commerce.First,three sequential game modes are developed in which the commission rate is determined by the live streaming market and the commission rate is negotiated by both parties.Second,a new live streaming sales function is designed by introducing live streaming popularity value,price discount rate and live streaming conversion rate.Third,both parties'optimal strategies,consumer welfare,competitive equilibrium and cooperation stability are examined under different cooperation modes.The results demonstrate that(1)When the commission rate is determined by the live streaming market,the two par-ties cannot reach a cooperation equilibrium under the six cooperation modes,and it is difficult to achieve long-term cooperation through profit sharing or cost sharing contracts.However,the introduction of a commission rate negotiation mechanism can improve the benefits of live streaming.(2)The current cooperation mode of"merchant decides the price discount rate,and the anchor is responsible for the conversion rate of live stream-ing"is actually a"prisoner's dilemma"cooperation mode with the lowest live streaming sales."Just-needed"products or products with low profit margins that consumers are less price-sensitive are not suitable for live streaming commerce.When the market commission rate is high,it is the best cooperation mode for a strong"head"anchor to lead the live streaming.(3)The fixed fee for live streaming does not have a substantial impact on both parties'selection of cooperation strategies,and there is always a strong"collusive"motive for anchors and merchants to make profits by falsely bidding on the market price(original price)of commodities and formulating high price discount rates.This study contributes to the governance and operation optimization of live streaming market.

live streaminge-commerceplatform economycooperation modegame theory

程永伟

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华东理工大学商学院,上海 200237

直播 电商 平台经济 合作模式 博弈论

国家自然科学基金重点项目国家自然科学基金青年项目

7203200171904018

2024

中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.938
ISSN:1003-207X
年,卷(期):2024.32(5)