首页|基于服务竞争的远视零售商联合采购联盟的竞合博弈策略分析

基于服务竞争的远视零售商联合采购联盟的竞合博弈策略分析

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零售商虽然可在订货量上相互合作汇集需求,但它们在服务方面却依然可保持竞争,从而形成了基于服务竞争的零售商联合采购的竞合关系。针对在竞合关系下联合采购联盟中零售商的运作策略、零售商联合采购联盟的稳定结构等问题,本文首先讨论了不同联盟结构下零售商的运作策略,然后采用合作博弈论中最大一致集的概念刻画远视零售商联合采购联盟的稳定结构。结果表明:(1)当零售商的单位服务成本较低或较高时,零售商的服务水平总是在大联盟时最高;当零售商的单位服务成本适中时,两个零售商联合采购时联盟外部零售商的服务水平最高。(2)当单位服务成本较低或适中时,结成大联盟时零售商的订货量最高;当单位服务成本较高,两个零售商联合采购时,联盟内部零售商的订货量高于结成大联盟时的订货量。(3)当单位服务成本足够高时,各零售商总是在结成大联盟时的利润最高,远视零售商以形成大联盟为稳定结构。
Co-Opetition Game Analysis of Joint Purchasing Coalitions of Farsighted Retailers Based on Service Competition
With the increasingly fierce market competition,in order to reduce procurement costs and obtain competitive advantages,small and medium-sized retailers form joint purchasing coalitions,cooperate with each other and collect demand,so that they have no obvious difference in product quality and price,but they still keep competitive in service,then they formed a co-opetition relationship of retailer joint procurement based on service competition.Three retailers based on service competition are considered to purchase products from a common manufacturer and then sell them to consumers.There are three joint purchasing coalitions for retailers,namely retailer purchase independently,two retailers purchase jointly and three retailers purchase jointly.It is assumed that the demand of retailer i is affected by its own service level and the service level of others retailers,the demand function of retailer i is:qi(s)=α+βsi-β/3∑j≠isj,i=1,2,3,where a is the basic market demand of each retailer,β is the sensitivity of market demand to the retailer's service level;the service cost of retailer i is assumed to be ηs2i/2.According to the above assumptions,firstly,the service level,market demand and profit of retailers under different coalition structures are compared,and the optimal strategy choice of retailer joint procurement coalition is obtained,and then the concept of largest consistent set in cooperative game theory are used to describe the stable structure of joint purchasing coalition of farsighted retailers.The results shows that,(1)if the service cost is low or high,retailers will provide the highest service level when they form the grand purchasing coalition,if the unit service cost is moderate,the external retailers will provide the higher service level when two retailers jointly purchase.(2)The order quantity of retailers in grand coalition is the highest when the unit service cost is low or moderate,if the unit service is high,the internal retailers in two-retailer purchasing coalition will get the highest purchase demand.(3)If the unit service cost is high enough,the profits of every retailer are the highest when they form the grand purchasing coalition,and the coalition will keep stable.The research results provide a decision-making basis for the choice of retailer service strategy and maintaining the stable structure of the coalition in the joint procurement coalition under the relationship of co-opetition.

service competitionpurchasing coalitionfarsighted retailersco-opetition game

肖旦、姬晓楠、罗颜、周永务

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广州大学管理学院,广东广州 510006

华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州 510641

服务竞争 采购联盟 远视零售商 竞合博弈

国家自然科学基金项目教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目广东省哲学社会科学规划青年项目广东省自然科学基金项目

7180206423YJC630196GD23YGL252024A1515010776

2024

中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.938
ISSN:1003-207X
年,卷(期):2024.32(7)