首页|不同持股策略下新能源汽车供应链纵向合作创新决策研究

不同持股策略下新能源汽车供应链纵向合作创新决策研究

扫码查看
针对新能源汽车供应链创新的高成本及企业间合作鲁棒性较弱的现象,将持股策略引入到新能源汽车供应链中,通过构建供应商持股、制造商持股、交叉持股等不同情形下新能源汽车供应链纵向合作创新的博弈模型,探讨持股策略适用的必要条件及不同情形下企业的创新决策。研究结果表明:(1)纵向持股策略下,电池的续航能力和裸车质量水平随持股比例的提高而提高;电池批发价格和新能源汽车销售价格随供应商持股比例提高而降低,但随制造商持股比例的提高而提高。(2)交叉持股策略下,电池的续航能力、电池批发价格和新能源汽车销售价格对制造商持股比例反应较敏感,交叉持股对裸车质量水平的影响较为复杂。(3)电池供应商更倾向于选择交叉持股策略,但交叉持股策略对制造商利润影响较为复杂,只有当制造商持股比例较低且供应商持股比例在一定水平时,制造商才会选择交叉持股策略。
Different Shareholding Strategies on the Operation Decision of New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain
In recent years,many NEV(new energy vehicle)manufacturershave collaborated with battery sup-pliers to vigorously promote the technology of NEV product.For example,in 2017,BMW signed a $117 mil-lion battery-production contract with Contemporary Amperex Technology Ltd(CATL),the world largest bat-tery manufacturers.After that,the CATL has signed several development and supply contracts with NEV manufacturers(such as,Toyota,Chang an et al.).However,the stability of collaboration is challenged by the innovation cost,opportunity behavior and conflicts interest,which lead to a low innovation effectiveness.In view of the difficulties of the manufacturers and distrust with the suppliers in NEV supply chain,the sharehold-ing strategy is introduced into the NEV supply chain.Considering whether the shareholding strategy is introduced and who holds share in the investments,the game theory and operational research optimization methods are embraced to develop the mathematical models for different scenarios.Firstly,a game model is built in which the manufacturers and supplier do not collaborate in innovation and this model is treated as a benchmark model for comparison.Secondly,a game model is adopted in which the battery supplier holds shares of NEV manufacturer.Then,a game model is developed in which the NEV manufacturer holds shares of battery supplier.Finally,the situation of NEV manufacturer and battery supplier hold share with each other is designed.In order to draw some valuable conclusions,the models are analyzed through numerical analysis,focusing on the relationship between the shareholding strategy and decision-making and innovation activities.Our findings show that the decision of boththe NEV manufacturers and battery suppliers is affected by the propor-tion of shares.In the longitudinal shareholding strategy model,the battery endurance and vehicle quality are positively affected bythe proportion of shares.Besides,both the wholesale price of the battery and the selling price are positively affected bythe proportion of supplier's shares,and are negatively affected bythe proportion of NEV manufacturer's shares.Furthermore,it is found that the supplier prefers the cross-shareholding strategy since he can gain more profit than that under the other shareholding strategies.However,for the manufacturer,he chooses the cross-shareholding strategy only when his shareholding ratio is low and the supplier's sharehold-ing ratio reaches a certain level.

shareholding strategiesbattery lifevehicle quality levelsupply chain innovation

刘丛、刘洁、王桐远、宋永涛、郑本荣

展开 >

河南大学商学院,河南开封 475001

苏州大学商学院智慧供应链研究中心,江苏苏州 215021

华中农业大学经济管理学院,湖北 武汉 430070

持股策略 续航能力 裸车质量水平 供应链创新

2024

中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.938
ISSN:1003-207X
年,卷(期):2024.32(11)