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基于公众参与的灾后交通基础设施韧性治理动态博弈模型

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灾害极易破坏城市交通基础设施运营甚至产生系统性瘫痪风险,进而损害其在城市运行中发挥的重要作用。因此,研究如何提升灾后交通基础设施韧性治理显得十分必要。现有研究主要集中于政府或运营单位单一主体决策,缺乏考虑公众参与以及三方之间的合作与制衡。本文将灾害因素和公众参与纳入灾后交通基础设施韧性治理决策,构建基于公众参与的灾后韧性治理动态博弈模型,并探讨了不同资源约束条件下韧性治理效果和提升策略。研究发现:公众监督和政府激励有利于韧性的提升,但灾害等级较高时,政府激励效果折减;政府财政激励政策和运营单位韧性治理策略应随资源约束情况调整,当资源约束过于严苛时激励政策可能失灵。本文揭示了灾后交通基础设施韧性治理过程中多主体决策行为的交互影响及其对韧性水平的影响,为灾后交通基础设施韧性治理提供了科学决策依据。
A Dynamic Game Model for Post-disaster Resilience Governance of Transport Infrastructure Based on Public Participation
Disasters can easily damage the functionality of urban transportation infrastructure and even create the risk of systemic paralysis,thereby compromising its important role in urban operation.Therefore,it is neces-sary to study how to improve the post-disaster resilience governance.Existing research mainly focus on the single-agent decision-making of the government or operating companies,and limited consideration has been placed on the public(e.g.,their participation,cooperation and bargaining).The disaster factors and public participation are incorporated into the decision making of transportation infrastructure's post-disaster resilience governance,a dynamic game model is constructed for government and operating companies,and the effects of such a resilience governance structure and improvement strategies is discussed under different resource constraints.It is found that:(1)public scrutiny and government incentives are conducive to improving resilience,but in the case of a high disaster level,the effect of government incentives is reduced;and(2)government incentive policies and the operating company's resilience governance plans should be adjusted according to resource constraints,namely,when resource constraints are too strict,incentives may fail.The interactive influence of multi-agent decision-making behavior and its impact on the post-disaster resilience level is revealed in the context of transportation infrastructure,and thus a robust decision-making underpinning for transportation infrastructure'post-disaster resilience governance is provided.

transportation infrastructureresilience governanceStackelberg gamepublic participationresource constraints

刘炳胜、崔巧艳、王丹、赵剑锋

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天津大学管理与经济学部,天津 300072

重庆大学公共管理学院,重庆 400044

诺森比亚大学建筑与建成环境学院,英国纽卡斯尔 NE1 8ST

交通基础设施 韧性治理 Stackelberg博弈 公众参与 资源约束

2024

中国管理科学
中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所

中国管理科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.938
ISSN:1003-207X
年,卷(期):2024.32(11)