Study on Cooperative Strategy of Government-enterprise Joint Reserve of Emergency Supplies
A supply system is studied in which the government,core suppliers and node suppliers jointly reserve emergency supplies.On the basis of establishing the principal-agent relationship between government and enterprise,two forms of cost sharing contract are proposed:(1)Reserve cost sharing contract,which is a kind of classical cost sharing mechanism,that is,the dominant core supplier in the supply chain unilaterally shares part of the reserve cost of the node supplier;(2)Bilateral cost-sharing contract with revenue sharing,that is,core suppliers share fixed proportion of reserve revenue and reward and punishment revenue with node suppli-ers,and at the same time,two suppliers share certain proportion of reserve cost for each other,forming a two-way subsidy mechanism.By means of differential game,the optimal decision-making strategy of government and enterprise is deduced.Finally,combined with numerical simulation,the differential effects of purchase price and other parameters on equilibrium strategy and Fed inventory under two contract forms are investigated,and some management implications are obtained.The results show that:(1)Compared with the classical CS contract with unilateral compensation mechanism as the core,RS&BS contract enables the government to have a larger range of executable purchase price by introducing revenue sharing and bilateral compensation mechanism;(2)The cooperation form of suppliers will also reverse the government's pricing strategy.Under THE RS&BS contract,the sharing strategy of the core supplier only depends on the revenue distribution within the supplier,while under the CS contract,its sharing strategy is restricted by the external purchase price.(3)CS contract and RS&BS contract have their own best application scenarios.The CS contract can increase the quantity and reserve efficiency of the Fed's inventory.RS&BS contracts are more helpful in keeping inventories at a stable and safe level.