Adverse Selection of Investors in PPP Project Considering Competition Scenario
In the bidding stage of PPP projects,some investors who lack sufficient strength and are unable to promote project efficiency improvement deceive the government through disguised means in order to obtain project franchise rights.This opportunistic behavior is called adverse selection.Once adverse selection by inves-tors occurs,it can damage project performance and social benefits,and in severe cases,lead to the phenomenon of"bad money drives out good money"in the PPP project market.This will greatly hinder the sustainable development of the PPP model.It is necessary for the government to address the issue of adverse selection.Therefore,a signaling game model between government and investors is constructed.And the separation equilibrium conditions that reveal the investor's true capabilities are calculated.The results show that there is the optimal range of profit rate to satisfy the separation equilibrium conditions.Investors will choose to quote truthfully if and only if the profit rate set by the government is within the optimal range.In addition,considering the scenario that investors'competition,the strategy of investors is compared in different scenario.The results show that competition among investors has no absolute positive or negative influence on the formation of separa-tion equilibrium conditions.Only when the government's reputation loss is small enough,the competition between investors with different abilities will be conducive to the formation of separation equilibrium.Otherwise,the existence of competition with different abilities reduces the upper limit of the profit rate given by the government,which is not conducive to the formation of separation equilibrium in the market.Finally,this paper uses actual data from the Bazhong to Wanyuan Expressway in Sichuan Province as a case study to verify the effectiveness of the conclusions drawn.The research of this paper can provide theoretical basis and decision-making reference for the mechanism design of the government to correctly identify investor capability informa-tion in the bidding stage.
PPP projectbidding stageadverse selectionsignaling game
万方数据
维普
