Revenue Distribution Strategy of Shared Parking Participants Based on Evolutionary Game
Parking conflicts in large cities are a growing concern.Shared parking has emerged as a potential solution for alleviating parking difficulties.However,the uneven distribution of proceeds among participating entities has hindered its rapid promotion.This study employs evolutionary game theory to explore the equilibrium revenue and cooperation strategies among participants in shared parking berths.The interests of the three main stakeholders,namely,the shared parking platform,parking-management company,and berth owners,are considered.This study analyzes the revenue distribution strategy under different parking-berth purchase/leasing scenarios,including all one-time purchases for the berth owners,mixed one-time purchases and leasing,and all leasing,encompassing a detailed analysis of these three scenarios.First,the game strategy relationship among the three stakeholders was analyzed to establish an evolutionary game model of them under incomplete information.Second,the stability of the replicated dynamic system equations of the stakeholders'game strategy was analyzed.Finally,the game strategy relationship was analyzed using theoretical derivation and analog simulation.The simulation results show the following:① When the shared parking platform subsidy is increased by 50％,the evolutionary convergence speed is accelerated by 20％;② when the revenue of the parking-management company increase by 50％,the evolutionary convergence speed is accelerated by 36％;③ it is beneficial for shared parking platforms to increase the amount of subsidy and percentage of revenue for parking-management companies to promote shared parking cooperation;④ the following revenue distribution strategy for the stakeholders under the three scenarios were obtained:all one-time purchases for the berth owners,mixed one-time purchases and leasing,and all leasing.This study provides new insights into addressing the issue of unclear revenue distribution in shared parking,thereby providing theoretical guidance for effectively promoting its development.
traffic engineeringshared parkingtripartite gameevolutionary analysisrevenue distribution
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