首页|地方隐性债务、银行风险感知与企业信贷可得性

地方隐性债务、银行风险感知与企业信贷可得性

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防范化解地方政府债务风险是中国当前经济工作的重点问题之一,特别是地方隐性债务风险及其处置事关能否"守住不发生系统性风险底线".地方隐性债务风险是否会通过银行部门向实体经济溢出,进而影响域内企业的投融资行为有待检验.本文构建了政府、银行以及企业三个部门的联动框架,研究地方隐性债务风险如何影响域内企业信贷可得性.研究发现,地方隐性债务风险的增加会降低域内企业的信贷可得性,且在地方财政监管力度低、地区商业银行数字化转型程度低以及国有企业的样本中作用更加明显.上述结论在进行了内生性问题讨论及一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立.机制研究表明,地方隐性债务风险会通过提升银行的流动性囤积水平、提高贷款利率发挥作用.进一步研究表明,地方隐性债务风险并没有导致企业外部融资约束的提升,原因在于其会促使域内企业进行融资结构的调整和优化,提升股权和商业信用融资水平.然而,向商业信用融资的转变,存在域内重大风险向外蔓延的可能.本文的研究厘清了地方隐性债务风险通过银行风险感知作用于实体经济和微观企业的内在渠道,为地方政府实现"防风险"和"稳增长"双重目标提供了有益思考.
Local Implicit Debt Risk,Banks'Risk Perception and Corporate Credit Availability
The report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China states that it is necessary to"guard the bottom line against systemic risks".Government implicit debt is a critical area of risk prevention and resolution.Commercial banks,as the most important provider of funds for local government implicit debt,have the keenest sense of local implicit debt risk.At the same time,commercial banks are the most important suppliers of funds to all kinds of market players in China,which are important hubs connecting various sectors.Can their perception of the risk of local implicit debt affect their credit allocation to enterprises in the same region?This paper attempts to investigate the impact of local implicit debt risk on the availability of credit to enterprises through rigorous empirical research and to clarify its possible influence mechanism.Using a sample of listed companies from 2005 to 2020,this paper explores the impact of local implicit debt risk on the availability of credit to local enterprises,and the channels of its effect through the establishment of a three-sectoral analytical framework of governments,banks and enterprises.It is found that an increase in local implicit debt risk significantly reduces the credit availability of local firms,and is more significant in the samples with lower local financial regulation,lower digitization of regional commercial banks,and state-owned enterprises(SOEs).The mechanism analysis shows that an increase in local implicit debt risk reduces credit availability to firms by increasing banks'liquidity hoarding and raising lending rates.Further research shows that an increase in local implicit debt risk significantly increases the scale of equity financing and the scale of commercial credit financing for firms.This paper integrates the government,banks and enterprises into one analytical framework to investigate the impact of local implicit debt risk on the availability of credit to enterprises,which helps to clarify the potential mechanism of risk transmission,and provides relevant empirical evidence and policy recommendations.Compared with existing studies,this paper may have the following contributions.It enriches research on local implicit debt risk.Most of the existing studies on implicit debt risk focus on the measurement and contagion of the risk,and there are few studies on the relation between local implicit debt risk and enterprises,while the study in this paper can fill in this gap.In addition,previous research on government implicit debt and corporate finance has only focused on debt financing,and this paper finds that when the credit availability of enterprises is affected by local implicit debt risk,it may force enterprises to adjust or optimize their own financing structure.This result is also useful for understanding the economic impact of local implicit debt risk.Finally,this paper clarifies the potential ways of local implicit debt risk transmission to the real economy,which can help establish a more accurate and powerful monitoring mechanism of implicit debt risk,clear the blockage of economic development,and provide reference for the realization of the dual objectives of"risk prevention"and"stable growth".

local implicit debt riskcorporate financingbank loansliquidity hoarding

蔡庆丰、吴奇艳、吴冠琛

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厦门大学经济学院

地方隐性债务风险 企业融资 银行贷款 流动性囤积

国家社会科学基金重大项目

23&ZD079

2024

中国工业经济
中国社会科学院工业经济研究所

中国工业经济

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:2.932
ISSN:1006-480X
年,卷(期):2024.(1)
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