Commercial Digital Platform Rent,Antitrust Regulation and Personal Consumption Data Ownership:A Two-sided Market Model Based on Political Economy
Commercial digital platforms(CDPs)use digital technologies to significantly accelerate capital circulation and turnover.However,the possession of data by CDPs can lead to monopolistic and unfair competition,necessitating in-depth research on the antitrust regulation of CDPs.The data utilized by CDPs is generated from personal consumption behaviors and involves personal privacy.Therefore,how to confirm the ownership of personal consumption data requires further exploration.Based on the principles of political economics,this paper constructs a mathematical model reflecting the characteristics of a two-sided market to analyze the implications of personal consumption data ownership under two scenarios:ownership by CDPs and ownership by consumers(workers).The model distinguishes three market structures:competition,oligopoly,and monopoly,and then investigates the nature of profits and rents generated by CDPs and their impact on social reproduction.Research findings are as follows.Firstly,improving the circulation efficiency and average profit rate achieved by CDPs is the prerequisite for production sectors to use their services.Differential rent is a mechanism for transferring excess profits based on enhanced circulation efficiency,while monopoly rent is for transferring average profits based on monopoly position and power.Secondly,the ownership of personal consumption data can alter social distribution relationships and the scale and structure of total demand.In a wage-led economy,assigning data ownership to individuals is more conducive to social reproduction,whereas,in a profit-led economy,assigning data ownership to CDPs is more beneficial.Thirdly,the lack of antitrust regulation for CDPs can undermine the revenue distribution effects of personal consumption data ownership,which enables these platforms to collect monopoly rent,potentially distorting the valuation of data elements and allowing them to recoup the data usage fees paid to consumers.This paper provides suggestions for antitrust regulation and data ownership.The key suggestions are as follows.Firstly,it is necessary to avoid blanket judgments on platform revenues.Regulation should allow for the existence of differential rent while limiting the collection of monopoly rent,preventing CDPs from excessively squeezing the average profit across society.Secondly,we should adopt a holistic approach to data ownership for social reproduction.This includes accounting for the characteristics of wage-led and profit-led economies during specific periods and balancing the needs for circulation efficiency improvement and personal privacy protection at different stages of economic development.Thirdly,a comprehensive design for antitrust regulation and data ownership should be adopted.This involves balancing data ownership protection,economic efficiency,and revenue distribution.Coordinated policy measures should guide CDPs and data elements to play a positive role in supporting high-quality development.
commercial digital platform rentantitrust regulationpersonal consumption data ownership confirmtwo-sided market
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