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港口投资内陆运输系统对其横向合作的传导机制研究

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在港口努力提高内陆运输服务便利性以获取竞争优势的大背景下,为防止港口间无序竞争带来的危害,构建了一个无限次重复博弈模型,以探讨港口投资和横向合作二者的相互作用关系,同时分析投资转化系数、货主效用增加值以及未来现金流估值等因素对均衡策略的影响。研究结果表明:首先,港口在单次博弈中并不会合作,只有在重复博弈的过程中才存在合作的可能性。从长期博弈的视角来看,港口独家投资行为将会降低港口间合作状态的稳定性。其次,港口对未来现金流的估值决定港口间长期稳定状态,而投资转化效率和投资规模则会影响港口投资均衡策略。最后,在相同投资情景下,港口在合作状态下获得的利润高于在竞争状态下获得的利润,因此横向合作有助于港口实施投资行为。
Research on transmission mechanism of port investments in inland transport systems on their horizontal cooperation
In the context of ports' efforts to improve the convenience of inland transportation services in order to gain competitive advantages,and in order to prevent the harm caused by uncontrolled competition among ports,this paper constructs an infinite iterative game model in order to explore the interactions between port investment and horizontal cooperation,and at the same time analyzes the impacts of factors such as investment conversion coefficients,the value-added of the cargo owner's utility,and the valuation of the future cash flow on the equilibrium strategy.The following results are obtained:firstly,ports will not cooperate in a single-game scenario,and cooperation is only possible in the process of repeated games.From the perspective of long-term games,the exclusive port investment will reduce the stability of cooperation between ports.Secondly,the valuation of future cash flows by ports determines the long term stable state between ports,while the investment conversion efficiency and investment scale will affect the equilibrium investment strategy of ports,Finally,under the same investment scenario,the profits obtained by port investment through cooperation is higher than that obtained through competition,so horizontal cooperation will promote port investment.

transportation economyport investmentinland transporthorizontal cooperationrepeated gameoptimal strategy

赵澎涛、汪传旭

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上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

交通运输经济 港口投资 内陆运输 横向合作 重复博弈 最优策略

2024

中国航海
中国航海学会

中国航海

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.458
ISSN:1000-4653
年,卷(期):2024.47(4)