Research on the evolutionary game of carbon emission reduction for coal transportation enterprises under dual governance
The traditional coal transportation has produced a lot of carbon emissions.Driven by profit maximization,the carbon emission reduction behaviors of coal transportation enterprises need the dual governance of local and central governments.By using evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation method,a tripartite evolutionary game model of central government,local government and coal transportation enterprise was constructed,and the scenario simulation was carried out with the help of MATLAB simulation software.The results showed that the excessive cost of carbon emission reduction for the central and local governments would result in the inability of the government to fulfill its responsibilities effectively;the initial willingness of local government would affect the strategic choice of coal transportation enterprises;excessive carbon reduction costs for coal transportation enterprises would affect their willingness to reduce carbon emissions;carbon emission reduction penalty was positively correlated with the strategy choices of the governments and enterprises,and the bonus was positively correlated with the strategy choices of the supervised subjects,but negatively correlated with the supervisors'strategies.So the setting of the penalty and bonus was very crucial.On the basis,some suggestions were proposed to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction by coal transportation enterprises.
万方数据
维普
