Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization and the Deviation in Implementation of Local Government Expenditure Budgets:From the Perspective of Vertical Decentralization and Horizontal Competition
The two typical phenomena with the"Chinese-style fiscal decentralization",namely vertical fiscal imbalance and horizontal government competition,are the deep reasons that affect the budget behavior of local governments.Based on the analysis of the theoretical model,this paper uses the budget and final accounts data of provincial and prefecture-level cities in China to analyze the influence of the unique fiscal decentralization mode on the deviation in implementation of local government expenditure budgets and its mechanism from the perspective of vertical fiscal imbalance and horizontal government competition.The results show that,on the one hand,the vertical fiscal imbalance and horizontal government competition directly reduce the deviation in implementation of local government expenditure budgets,but there may be a risk of"budget flush"behind this phenomenon.On the other hand,they can also indirectly exacerbate the deviation in implementation of local government expenditure budgets by affecting the accuracy of budgeting.Budget audit can weaken the effect of vertical fiscal imbalance on the deviation in implementation of local government expenditure budgets,but it does not affect the role of horizontal government competition.Further analysis shows that the vertical fiscal imbalance and horizontal government competition also reduce the balance of local government expenditure budget implementation throughout the year.Compared with those at the provincial level,the effects of vertical fiscal imbalance and horizontal government competition are greater at the prefecture-level cities.
Chinese-style Fiscal DecentralizationVertical Fiscal ImbalanceHorizontal Government CompetitionExpenditure Budget Implementation Deviation
万方数据
