Individual Financing Policy of Resident Medical Insurance:Origin,Dilemma and Optimization
The resident medical insurance is a principal institutional arrangement of China's health insurance system,where the farmers constitute the main insured group within the system and the quality of the system is directly related to the vital interests of farmers.The health insurance adopts the financing model of"financial subsidies+individual contributions".In the situation that the personal payment standard of the resident medical insurance has been rising for years,which triggers the decline of residents'payment motivation and even the phenomenon of their no longer participating in the insurance,there is an urgent need to comprehensively review the current resident medical insurance financing policy of paying the fixed or equal amount of medical insurance premiums according to the headcount and its adverse effects,and to seek for a more reasonable policy design and practice path.The practice of resident medical insurance shows that the current individual financing mechanism violates the equity principle of medical insurance financing,resulting in the increasing payment burden of low-income groups,especially farmers,It has exacerbated the regressive adjustment of the health insurance system,and also leads to the"short board effect",leading to a paradox of the coexistence of large payment pressure of some groups and low overall financing level.Therefore,it is imperative to reform the current financing standard determination method and annual adjustment method,and comprehensively consider the per capita disposable income of residents and the level of economic and social development,aiming to achieve a financing goal according to a certain proportion of individual or family income.
The Resident Medical InsuranceQuota FinancingOptimized PathCommon Prosperity
万方数据
维普
