Dynamic and time-delay features of reward and punishment measures for collusive behavior in carbon verification
In the current global effort to achieve peak carbon emissions and carbon neutrality,establishing an efficient and credible carbon market is crucial for promoting the reduction of carbon emissions.To ensure the authenticity,reliability,and scientific nature of carbon emission reporting in the operation of the carbon market,the Chinese government has adopted a Monitoring,Reporting,and Veri-fication (MRV) system based on the management methods of international carbon markets.The core of this system is for local govern-ments to introduce third-party verification institutions to check enterprises' carbon emission reports and report to the government.In practice,collusion often occurs,where emitting enterprises bribe third-party institutions to conceal the actual amount of carbon emis-sions,posing challenges to the compliant operation of the carbon market.To explore how local governments can solve the collusion prob-lems,this study constructed three types of evolutionary game models:a static reward-punishment model,a dynamic reward-punishment model,and a time-delay effect model.On this basis,theoretical and simulation analyses were conducted using the operation data of the Shenzhen carbon market in China.The research findings indicated that:① The development of the carbon verification system experi-enced three stages,with the middle stage being an unstable phase where the intentions of all participants could not converge,leading to significant volatility within the carbon verification system and resulting in the ineffectiveness of government rewards and punishments during this phase.② The introduction of dynamic reward and punishment measures had a positive regulatory effect on the instability of the middle stage of the carbon verification system,allowing the system to evolve around a unique evolutionary stable strategy spiral;the introduction of the time-delay effect could make the system evolution approach an ideal stable state,having a more significant regulato-ry effect on instability.③ Local governments' regulation of third-party institutions was more challenging than that of the emitting enter-prises.Therefore,local governments need to set strict entry standards for third-party institutions and flexibly formulate reward and pun-ishment measures based on the behavior of third-party institutions and emitting enterprises to ensure the compliant operation of carbon verification.
carbon verificationevolutionary gamedynamic reward and punishment measurestime-delay effectthird-party agency
万方数据
维普
