首页|Discreet investors exert greater influence on cooperation in the public goods game

Discreet investors exert greater influence on cooperation in the public goods game

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This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.

public goods gameheterogeneous investmentdiscreet investorscooperation

康洪炜、金展瑶、李明远、旺咩、孙兴平、沈勇、陈清毅

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School of Software,Yunnan University,Kunming 650000,China

College of Information Science and Engineering,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110004,China

Open Foundation of Key Laboratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan ProvinceOpen Foundation of Key Laboratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province

2020SE3082020SE309

2024

10.1088/1674-1056/ad0113

中国物理B(英文版)
中国物理学会和中国科学院物理研究所

中国物理B(英文版)

CSTPCDEI
影响因子：0.995
ISSN：1674-1056
年,卷(期)：2024.33(3)
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