中国物理B(英文版)2024,Vol.33Issue(5) :182-192.DOI:10.1088/1674-1056/ad20d8

Evolutionary game dynamics of combining two different aspiration-driven update rules in structured populations

杨智昊 杨彦龙
中国物理B(英文版)2024,Vol.33Issue(5) :182-192.DOI:10.1088/1674-1056/ad20d8

Evolutionary game dynamics of combining two different aspiration-driven update rules in structured populations

杨智昊 1杨彦龙1
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作者信息

  • 1. Mathematics and Statistics School,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China
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Abstract

In evolutionary games,most studies on finite populations have focused on a single updating mechanism.How-ever,given the differences in individual cognition,individuals may change their strategies according to different updating mechanisms.For this reason,we consider two different aspiration-driven updating mechanisms in structured populations:satisfied-stay unsatisfied shift(SSUS)and satisfied-cooperate unsatisfied defect(SCUD).To simulate the game player's learning process,this paper improves the particle swarm optimization algorithm,which will be used to simulate the game player's strategy selection,i.e.,population particle swarm optimization(PPSO)algorithms.We find that in the prisoner's dilemma,the conditions that SSUS facilitates the evolution of cooperation do not enable cooperation to emerge.In con-trast,SCUD conditions that promote the evolution of cooperation enable cooperation to emerge.In addition,the invasion of SCUD individuals helps promote cooperation among SSUS individuals.Simulated by the PPSO algorithm,the theoretical approximation results are found to be consistent with the trend of change in the simulation results.

Key words

evolutionary game dynamics/aspiration-driven update/structured populations

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基金项目

Doctoral Foundation Project of Guizhou University(201949)

国家自然科学基金(71961003)

贵州省科技计划(7223)

出版年

2024
中国物理B(英文版)
中国物理学会和中国科学院物理研究所

中国物理B(英文版)

CSTPCDEI
影响因子:0.995
ISSN:1674-1056
参考文献量44
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