首页|Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game
Evolutionary dynamics of tax-based strong altruistic reward and punishment in a public goods game
扫码查看
点击上方二维码区域，可以放大扫码查看
原文链接
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
In public goods games,punishments and rewards have been shown to be effective mechanisms for maintaining indi-vidual cooperation.However,punishments and rewards are costly to incentivize cooperation.Therefore,the generation of costly penalties and rewards has been a complex problem in promoting the development of cooperation.In real society,specialized institutions exist to punish evil people or reward good people by collecting taxes.We propose a strong altruistic punishment or reward strategy in the public goods game through this phenomenon.Through theoretical analysis and nu-merical calculation,we can get that tax-based strong altruistic punishment(reward)has more evolutionary advantages than traditional strong altruistic punishment(reward)in maintaining cooperation and tax-based strong altruistic reward leads to a higher level of cooperation than tax-based strong altruistic punishment.
evolutionary game theorystrong altruismpunishmentreward
杨智昊、杨彦龙
展开 >
Mathematics and Statistics School,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
