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论实践理性自然法之不证自明性

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面对近代事实与价值二分法对自然法理论的冲击,当代自然法学家约翰·菲尼斯试图以自然法不证自明性跨越自然法认识论困境.然而,菲尼斯所提出的自然法不证自明性概念既继承了中世纪典范自然法学家托马斯·阿奎那的自明性传统,又包含了现代希尔伯特几何公理的自明性概念,二者在形而上学实在论立场上相互对立.这使菲尼斯的自然法不证自明性概念面临着本体论实在论与非实在论之间的张力,其对事实与价值二分法的回应以及自然法伦理学的构建也因此受到质疑.一种对自然法不证自明性的自洽理解可以从理论理性判断与实践理性判断的同一性之中得出,自然法原则作为理论理性判断是可推导的,但作为实践理性判断是无源出且不证自明的,这种理解也为弥合事实与价值之间的鸿沟提供了一种可能.
On the Self-evidence of Natural Law of Practical Reason
Facing the impact of the modem fact-value dichotomy on natural law theory,the con-temporary natural law jurist John Finnis tried to overcome the epistemological dilemma with the self-evi-dence of natural law.However,the concept of self-evidence of natural law proposed by Finnis not only inherits the tradition of self-evidence of Thomas Aquinas,the model natural jurist of the Middle Ages,but also includes the concept of self-evidence of Hilbert's geometric axioms,both of which are opposed to each other from the standpoint of metaphysical realism.This makes Finnis'concept of self-evidence of natural law face the tension between ontological realism and non-realism,and his response to the di-chotomy of fact and value and his construction of natural law ethics are therefore questioned.A self-con-sistent understanding of the self-evidence of natural law can be derived from the identity of judgments of theoretical reason and practical reason.A natural law principle is derivable as a judgment of theoretical reason,but underived and self-evident as a judgment of practical reason.This understanding also pro-vides a possibility of bridging the gap between fact and value.

epistemology of natural lawself-evidencefact-value dichotomypractical reasonhuman nature

胡悦、史彤彪

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中国人民大学法学院(北京 100872)

自然法认识论 不证自明性 事实与价值二分法 实践理性 人性

2024

浙江社会科学
浙江省社会科学界联合会

浙江社会科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.677
ISSN:1004-2253
年,卷(期):2024.(3)
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