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流量垄断的生成逻辑与治理路径

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数据要素的本质是市场供需信号,流量是数字空间内交易机会的表现形态,数据要素的极大丰富放大了注意力资源的相对稀缺,引发平台资本的流量垄断问题,即数字空间内交易机会的垄断性分配.平台作为流通组织分享而非创造剩余价值,这种分享围绕流量分配行为,以平台间"中心—外围"的剥削体系为表现形式,随着中心不断向外围输出流量以控制市场供需信号的传递并超额分配经济利益,必将在时空范畴内割裂统一大市场.对此,应谨防单一生态系统在通讯、支付和物流三大领域形成结构性闭环,并区分结构性平台和联系性平台进行分类监管.国家还可通过建设"平台政府",作为潜在竞争者适当介入市场竞争,保障数字市场的均衡开放.
The Generation Mechanism and Governance Path of Flow Monopoly
The generation of data elements and the scarcity of attention resources lead to the flow monopoly problem of platform capital.The essence of data elements is market supply and demand sig-nals,and flow is a digital trading opportunity formed based on data elements.The essence of flow mo-nopoly of platform capital is the monopolistic allocation of trading opportunities.The platform,as a cir-culation organization,shares rather than creates surplus value.This sharing takes the form of a"center-periphery"flow monopoly system between platforms.As the center continues to export flow to the pe-riphery to control and obtain economic benefits and market supply and demand signals,it will split uni-fied market in space and time domain.Therefore,this article proposes three governance suggestions:firstly,beware of a single ecosystem forming a structural closed-loop in three major fields of communi-cation,payment,and logistics;secondly,distinguish between structured and connected platforms and conduct classified supervision;finally,the state intervenes in market competition with the"platform government"as a potential competitor to ensure balanced opening of digital market.

center-peripherycirculation organizationstructural powercost successive trans-ferplatform government

赵秉元、徐信予

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中国人民大学交叉科学研究院

中共浙江省委党校平安浙江研究中心(北京 100872)

中共中央党校(国家行政学院)政治和法律教研部(北京 100091)

中心—外围 流通组织 结构性权力 成本递次转嫁 平台政府

国家社会科学基金

21CGJ030

2024

浙江社会科学
浙江省社会科学界联合会

浙江社会科学

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.677
ISSN:1004-2253
年,卷(期):2024.(5)
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