In the regionalization history of south Asia,the cooperation among states in this region has not run smoothly and has always been low in efficiency.Besides,these states have not dispelled hostility or built trust in the course of regionalism.This article applies the perspective of unsymmetrical payoff structures to explain how India,Pakistan,and the other weak South Asia states,which are players in regionalization of South Asia,adjust strategies and what ef-fects these strategies can cast on regional cooperation.This article argues that the power structure determines the scope of strategies players can choose and the characteristics of the payoff structure.In regional cooperation,an unsymmetrical payoff structure will decide whether the three key players can change their origi-nal strategies.India,weak South Asia states,and Pakistan adopt preferences of deadlock game,chicken game,and slimmer deadlock game for all of them take state security as a core concern,and the payoff structures also characterized by asymmetry.In regionalism in South Asia,there is a villain game between India and the weak South Asia states,and an asymmetry deadlock game between India and Pakistan.The two-game matrix indicates that regionalism is not only unben-efitial to the member country,but also that the intersection of strategies may gradually evolve into a stalemate in which all participating countries tend to be more uncooperative.Therefore,faced with the dilemma of"repeated failure"and"spillover of disputes",regionalism can play a positive role in promoting regional stability and prosperity only when participating countries reconstruct the compen-sation structure and break through the security-oriented logic.
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