机构大股东交叉持股与企业市场势力
Institutional Cross Shareholdings and the Enterprise Market Power
吴鼎纹 1王红建 2肖峻3
作者信息
- 1. 厦门大学 财务管理与会计研究院,福建 厦门 361005
- 2. 江西财经大学 财经数据科学重点实验室,江西 南昌 330013;江西财经大学 金融学院,江西 南昌 330013
- 3. 江西财经大学 金融学院,江西 南昌 330013
- 折叠
摘要
本文基于我国资本市场股权结构高度集中的特征,探究机构大股东交叉持股对企业市场势力的影响.研究发现,我国资本市场机构大股东交叉持股可以显著提高投资组合公司的产品市场势力,支持了"合谋效应"假说.异质性检验发现,股权集中度越高,合谋效应越强;相比于金融资本,产业资本交叉持股的合谋效应更强.机制检验发现,机构大股东交叉持股还会通过向上操纵持股公司的生产成本以"合理化"产品价格上升.经济后果检验发现,机构大股东交叉持股的合谋效应会显著弱化《反垄断法》的实施效果.本文揭示了机构大股东交叉持股的合谋效应,讨论了其对企业市场势力的影响,对市场监管具有重要的政策启示.
Abstract
Based on the highly concentrated equity structure in China's capital market,this paper ex-plores the institutional cross shareholdings and its influence on the enterprise market power.The study reveals that institutional cross shareholdings in China's capital market can significantly enhance a company's market power,supporting the hypothesis of"collusion effects".Heterogeneity tests show that the higher the concentration of equity ownership,the stronger the collusion effects,with industrial capital cross shareholdings exhibiting a stronger collusion effect compared to financial capital.Mechanism tests indicate that companies with institutional cross shareholdings en-gage in upward manipulation of production costs to"rationalize"the increase in product prices.Eco-nomic consequences tests reveal that the collusion effects of institutional cross shareholdings weaken the implementation effectiveness of the Antitrust Law significantly.Based on the crucial fea-ture of high equity concentration in China,this paper unveils the collusion effects of institutional cross shareholdings and clarifies its impact on the enterprise market power,thereby holding impor-tant policy implications for market supervision.
关键词
机构大股东/交叉持股/合谋效应/企业市场势力/《反垄断法》Key words
Institutional Major Shareholder/Cross Shareholdings/Collusion Effects/Enterprise Market Power/Antitrust Law引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家自然科学基金地区项目(71962020)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072079)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据