高管研发背景对短视行为的影响
The Impact of Executive R&D Background on Myopia Behavior
叶淑君 1蔡三希2
作者信息
- 1. 广东工商职业技术大学 商学院,广东 肇庆 526020
- 2. 肇庆学院 经济与管理学院,广东 肇庆 526061
- 折叠
摘要
基于高阶理论和烙印理论,以2013-2022年中国A股上市公司为样本,本研究考察了高管研发背景对短视行为的影响.研究发现高管研发背景与短视行为呈显著负相关关系,表明高管研发背景能抑制短视行为;分析师关注削弱了高管研发背景对短视行为的负向影响,表明了分析师关注能发挥调节作用.经稳健性检验后结论保持不变.异质性分析发现,高管研发背景与短视行为的负向关系在非国有企业和高科技行业中更为明显.
Abstract
Based on the higher order theory and branding theory,this study examines the impact of executive R&D background on myopia behavior,using China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022 as a sample.The study finds that executive R&D background is significantly negatively correlated with myopia behavior,indi-cating that executive R&D background can inhibit myopia behavior.Analyst attention weakens the negative im-pact of executive R&D background on myopia behavior,indicating that analyst attention can play a substitution effect.The conclusion remains unchanged after robustness test.Heterogeneity analysis finds that the negative rela-tionship between executive R&D background and myopia behavior is more obvious in non-state-owned enterpris-es and high-tech industries.
关键词
研发背景/短视行为/分析师关注Key words
R&D background/myopia behavior/analyst attention引用本文复制引用
基金项目
2024年度肇庆市哲学社会科学规划项目(24GJ-43)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据