首页|约翰·丹纳赫"伦理行为主义"辨析

约翰·丹纳赫"伦理行为主义"辨析

A Discussion of John Danaher's"Ethical Behaviorism"

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机器人是否具有道德地位,以及应当具有何种道德地位?这非但是科技进步所衍生的一大诉求,且更是社会伦理发展必须直面的重要议题.约翰·丹纳赫主张,如果机器人在行为上大致等同于具有重要道德地位的其他实体,那么机器人也应该具有重要的道德地位.该理论虽然具有"行为主义"的理论简洁性与伦理前瞻性,却在概念界定、论证与辩护方面仍存在诸多疑点.藉由区分"程序"非"理解"、"我行"非"我思"两个方面,可知论"迹"不足以论"心":只由行为的相似而赋予机器人相应的道德地位是"知其然"的判断,而若要做出"知其所以然"的充足说明,还必须考虑机器人行为背后是否存在自主意识、理解能力等属人的特性.
Do robots have a moral status,and what kind of moral status should they have?This is not only a major demand arising from technological pro-gress,but also an important issue that ethical development must address.John Danaher argues that if robots are roughly equivalent in behavior to other en-tities that have an important moral status,then robots should also have an important moral status.Although the theory has the theoretical simplicity and ethical foresight of"behaviorism",there are still many doubts about its conceptualization,justification,and defense.By distinguishing between the as-pects of"program"rather than"understanding"and"I do"rather than"I think",it can be seen that the theory of"signs"is not the same as that of"understanding".The"signs"are not sufficient for the"mind":assigning a moral status to robots based on behavioral similarities alone is a"knowing-ly"judgment,but to make a sufficient"knowingly"statement,one must also consider whether there are human characteristics such as autonomy and com-prehension that underlie the robot's behavior.

robotmoral statusethical behaviorismindependent consciousnesscomprehension ability

张璐、姜伟嘉、赵昆

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曲阜师范大学政治与公共管理学院,日照 276827

机器人 道德地位 伦理行为主义 自主意识 理解能力

国家社会科学基金一般项目

23BZX089

2024

自然辩证法研究
中国自然辩证法研究会

自然辩证法研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.395
ISSN:1000-8934
年,卷(期):2024.40(4)
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