知觉理证的合取观
The Conjunctive View about Perceptual Justification
王华平 1曲扬2
作者信息
- 1. 中山大学哲学系,珠海 519082
- 2. 山东大学哲学与社会发展学院,济南 250100
- 折叠
摘要
在知觉经验何以能够直接理证知觉信念这个问题上,当代认识论出现了两种针锋相对的观点:现象主义认为知觉经验凭借其现象特征提供直接理证;事实主义则认为凭借的是事实性内容.但是,现象主义存在"好的坏情形问题",事实主义会遇到诸如卓尔不凡的超级盲视者和超超级盲视者之类的反例问题.合取观,即知觉经验的现象特征和事实性内容合起来提供了直接理证的观点,能同时避开现象主义和事实主义的问题.
Abstract
As to the problem that how perceptual experience provides immediate justification for perceptual belief,there are two competing theories in con-temporary epistemology,that is,phenomenalism and factivism.Phenomenalism holds that perceptual experience provides immediate justification in virtue of its phenomenal character,while factivism holds that it is in virtue of factive content.But phenomenalism is conflicted with"the good-bad case"prob-lem,and factivism confronted with counterexamples such as the excellent super-blindsighter and the super-duper-blindsighter.The conjunctive view which holds that perceptual experience provides immediate justification in virtue of its phenomenal character and factive content,can avoid the problems both for phenomenalism and factivism.
关键词
知觉理证/现象主义/事实主义/合取观Key words
perceptual justification/phenomenalism/factivism/the conjunctive view引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA029)
国家社会科学基金重点项目(18AZX007)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据