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初始信念与新假说疑难

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新假说疑难,即如何在贝叶斯框架中合理提出新假说,是贝叶斯知识论用于假说检验情境出现的一大基础性难题.新假说疑难本质上是关于初始信念在贝叶斯框架中的合理辩护问题,对贝叶斯知识论的归纳辩护效力提出挑战.一些学者认为,新假说疑难可以在贝叶斯框架中得到消解,并提出置信间隙填补、性质预测、兜底假说等贝叶斯方案.通过考察这些方案的解题机制和主要困境,可以说认知者对新假说的初始信念难以在现有的贝叶斯框架中得到合理辩护.有效消解新假说疑难,需要进一步探究初始信念的形成机制和贝叶斯知识论的归纳基础.
Initial Belief and the Problem of New Hypotheses
The problem of new hypotheses(PNH)is a fundamental problem of Bayesian epistemology applied to hypothesis testing,which is about how to put forward new hypotheses legitimately in the Bayesian framework.PNH is essentially about the reasonable justification of initial belief,which challenges the inductive justification virtue of Bayesian epistemology.Some scholars believed that PNH could be resolved in the Bayesian framework,and proposed some Bayesian strategies,such as credence gap-filling,property-prediction,and catch-all hypothesis.By examining the mechanism and main dilem-mas of these strategies,it can be said that the initial belief in new hypotheses is hard to be justified in the Bayesian framework effectively.In order to re-solve PNH,it is necessary to further investigate the mechanism of forming initial belief and the inductive foundation of Bayesian epistemology.

the problem of new hypothesesBayesian epistemologyinitial beliefinductive justification

徐娟娟

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安徽大学马克思主义学院,合肥 230601

新假说疑难 贝叶斯知识论 初始信念 归纳辩护

国家社会科学基金重点项目中国博士后科学基金项目

23AZX0182023M730013

2024

自然辩证法研究
中国自然辩证法研究会

自然辩证法研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:0.395
ISSN:1000-8934
年,卷(期):2024.40(10)