Generative AI shifts the scarcity and incentive created by copyright law from the originality of expression to the intellectual efforts underlying expression,i.e.,the iteration of prompts.This provides a basis for the copyrightability of Generative AI works.The current opposing views overly focus on the issue of authorship,resulting in numerous argumentative challenges.The"will theory"fails to distinguish between the categorical intentions and semantic intentions of the author,overlooking the fact that the expressive content of all works cannot be determined,predicted,or controlled in an absolute sense by the author's free will.Additionally,resorting to the"creative assistant"clauses would confer legal personality on AI,and is not viable.The"process theory"links the copyrightability of a work to specific creative methods,which is inconsistent with the rules and purpose of copyright law.The criterion for the copyrightability of Generative AI works should shift from authorship to originality.Due to the extremely limited scope of exclusive rights,applying the"minimal degree of creativity"to Generative AI works will not lead to a proliferation of rights.
万方数据
维普
