Non-cognitivist explanations of conditional sentence reasoning about moral judge-ments face the challenge of the Frege-Geach problem.We examine classical solutions proposed by expressivists.The common basic strategy is to take normative statements in non-assertive contexts and transform them into non-normative statements in assertive contexts,thus giving a semantics that treats beliefs and attitudes/desires in a unified way.However,can attitudinal inconsistency be ultimately reduced to logical inconsistency by interpreting attitude statements with the help of belief statements?The problem of negation and the problem of disagreement continue to plague expressivists.The hybrid expressivism project,which attempts to combine beliefs and non-cognitive attitudes and to reduce the validity of reasoning to the logical connection of beliefs,actually leaves the expressivist position.Based on Gregory's theory of"desires as beliefs",we attempt to give a similar but different account of the hybrid inconsistency problem in practical reasoning to hybrid expressivism.The paper compares the differences between moral hypothetical reasoning,legal normative reasoning,and practical reasoning,and attempts to give a unified interpretation of the different types of reasoning about normative state-ments by giving an account of the relationship between beliefs and desires and intentions.
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