虚实之辨:论胡塞尔向实然状态的还原
The Distinction Between the Real and the Unreal in Mathematics,Physics and Phenomenological Philosophy:On Husserl's Reduction to the Real Content(Reellen Bestand)
宋文良1
作者信息
摘要
数学、物理学以及现象学哲学的思想交融突出反映在虚实、真假的区别问题上.数学中实数与虚数,物理学中实像与虚像、可感对象与超感对象间的区分,表现出数学和物理学中的虚实之辨,但这些区分在认识论现象学层面上仍不彻底而有其局限."是否可被怀疑"可作为认识论上区分虚实真假的严格且可靠标准,胡塞尔向实然状态的还原正是需要在这一标准下、在认识论批判语境中得到恰当理解和评价.迪特·洛玛对该还原之确切意涵的界定是正确的,但他关于"这一还原既(原则上)可行且又必要"的主张却不能成立.在虚实之辨的问题域下、在认识论批判和奠基的语境中,胡塞尔最终放弃向实然状态还原而代之以超越论还原的思想动因也将清晰可见.
Abstract
This paper discusses the distinction between real(Reelles)and unreal,as well as true and false,within the intersection of mathematical,physical,and phenomenological philosophical ideas.By exploring the three distinctions between real and imaginary numbers in mathematics,real and imaginary images,and sensible and supersensible objects in physics,the paper discusses the notions of real and unreal in mathematics and physics and points out their limitations and incompleteness from an epistemological phenomenological perspective.The article then proposes"whether or not something can be doubted"as a strict and reliable criterion for epistemologically distinguishing between real and unreal and discusses Husserl's reduction to the real content(reellen Bestand)in light of this criterion.The article supports Dieter Lohmar's definition of this reduction but refutes Lohmar's view that this reduction is(in principle)both possible and necessary.The paper thereby clarifies Husserl's motivation to eventually abandon the reduction to the real content and replace it with the transcendental reduction.
关键词
实然/体验材料/还原/普遍怀疑/现象学描述Key words
real(reell)/experience-data/reduction/universal doubt/phenomenological description引用本文复制引用
基金项目
中国博士后科学基金第 73 批面上资助项目(2023M733136)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据