Life-world and Familiarity:On Luhmann's Criticism of Husserl
This paper aims to examine Luhmann's criticism of Husserl's theory of life-world with a focus on the constitutive significance of familiarity for the life-world.For this purpose,this paper will analyze the concept of familiarity in Husserl's theory of life-world and point out that familiarity serves as a founding feature of life-world experience.What is more,it will be suggested that Luhmann's conception of life-world is based on everydayness of natural attitude,whereas Husserl's theory of life-world has a transcendental orientation which goes deeper than natural attitude.Furthermore three dimensions of the familiarity of life-world will be carefully examined:firstly,life-world as an"invariant style"serves as the source of pre-given meaningfulness;secondly,the familiarity of one's own body scaffolds a framework of meanings of life-world experience;thirdly,typification of experience characterizes the essential familiarity of life-world experience.