The Economic Behavior Logic of Local Government Constrained by Vertical Fiscal Imbalance from the Perspective of Financial Incentives with Chinese Characteristics
Since the reform of tax sharing system,China's fiscal system has shown the typical characteristics of vertical fiscal imbalance.The realization of the modernization of national governance depends on the top-down institutional arrangement and incentive design of the central government,which not only guarantees the authority of the central government but also fully mobilizes the enthusiasm of local governments.The institutional arrangement of vertical fiscal imbalance shows that the central government leads the direction of fiscal system reform in the process of"empowering and controlling power",pays attention to giving full play to the development enthusiasm of local governments,seeks to mobilize the enthusiasm of local economy and maintain the dynamic balance of central authority,and forms a financial incentive system with Chinese characteristics in practice.However,the vertical fiscal imbalance not only stimulates the economic competition behavior of local governments,but also induces the deviation behavior of local governments,which needs the intervention and correction of the central government.It is the key to understand the logic of Chinese-style fiscal reform to rationally explain the constraints of vertical fiscal imbalance arrangement on the economic behavior of local governments and deeply describe the dynamic game between central fiscal control and local rational autonomous behavior.Therefore,the future promotion of the modernization of the financial system reform should be extended to the guidance and reshaping of local government behavior,from the one-way logic of incentive mechanism to the comprehensive logic of governance power,and better promote the modernization of national governance.
Fiscal systemVertical fiscal imbalanceFinancial incentivesLocal government behavior
万方数据
维普
