Commitment Announcement and Financial Reporting Quality
As the public commitment of listed firms to disclose according to law,the economic consequences of the commitment announcement are widely concerned by the theoretical and practical fields.Based on the motivation of commitment announcement,this paper examines the impact of commitment announcement on financial reporting quality.We find that the release of corporate commitment announcements significantly reduces the quality of financial reports in terms of earnings management and the likelihood of irregularities.We further document that the reduction is mainly caused by the"propping"behavior of controlling shareholders under the signaling motivation and the"tunneling"behavior under the opportunistic motivation.We also find that the negative impact of commitment announcement on the financial reporting quality will be weakened when the company is subject to strong external supervision,while the negative impact will be strengthened when the company's information environment is poor.Overall,our evidence suggests that the release of commitment announcement violates the original intention of promoting the healthy development of capital market,and the guidance and supervision of commitment announcement still need to be further strengthened.
万方数据
维普
