Crowdfunding,as a new financial product that applies internet technology to the lending industry within digital finance,its quality is not only related to the operational status of crowdfunding platforms,but also affects the healthy development of digital finance.This study takes crowdfunding platforms as the research object to explore the decision-making and evolutionary equilibrium of project admission behavior with short-sighted cognition,and applies system dynamics for simulation.The results show that the evolutionary equilibrium results of platform project admission behavior mainly depend on factors such as the platform's short-sighted cognition,reputational benefits,and punishment costs,among which the bias of short-sighted cognition is the most important factor affecting the evolutionary equilibrium of the crowdfunding industry.Reducing the short-sighted cognition of a single platform,improving social reputation,and increasing punishment costs can quickly evolve the crowdfunding system to a state where high-quality projects are admitted.Therefore,external locking technology should be used to encourage platforms to strictly review projects and prevent too many low-quality projects from entering.At the same time,using laws and regulations for constraints,strengthening education and publicity,and optimizing platform business philosophies can correct cognitive biases and control evolutionary behavior from the root,promoting the positive development of the crowdfunding market.
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