首页|Equilibrium stacks for a three-person game on a product of staircase-function continuous and finite strategy spaces
Equilibrium stacks for a three-person game on a product of staircase-function continuous and finite strategy spaces
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NETL
NSTL
Sciendo
Abstract A method of solving a three-person game defined on a product of staircase-function strategy spaces is presented. The spaces can be finite and continuous. The method is based on stacking equilibria of “short” three-person games, each defined on an interval where the pure strategy value is constant. In the case of finite three-person games, which factually are trimatrix games, the equilibria are considered in general terms, so they can be in mixed strategies as well. The stack is any interval-wise combination (succession) of the respective equilibria of the “short” trimatrix games. Apart from the stack, there are no other equilibria in this “long” trimatrix game. An example is presented to show how the stacking is fulfilled for a case of when every “short” trimatrix game has a pure-strategy equilibrium. The presented method, further “breaking” the initial “long” game defined on a product of staircase-function finite spaces, is far more tractable than a straightforward approach to solving directly the “long” trimatrix game would be.
game theorypayoff functionalstaircase-function strategythree-person gametrimatrix game
NETL
NSTL
Sciendo
